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DANSSino is a reduced pilot version of a solid-state detector of reactor antineutrinos (to be created
within the DANSS project and installed under the industrial 3 GWth reactor of the Kalinin Nuclear
Power Plant – KNPP). Numerous tests performed at a distance of 11 m from the reactor core demonstrate
operability of the chosen design and reveal the main sources of the background. In spite of its small
size (20 × 20 × 100 cm3), the pilot detector turned out to be quite sensitive to reactor antineutrinos,
detecting about 70 IBD events per day with the signal-to-background ratio about unity.
1Corresponding author; e-mail: egorov@jinr.ru
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1 Detector DANSS
The DANSS project [1, 2, 3] is aimed at creating a relatively compact neutrino
spectrometer which does not contain any flammable or other dangerous liquids
and may therefore be located very close to the core of an industrial power reactor
(Fig. 1). Due to a high neutrino flux (∼ 5 × 1013 ν¯e/cm
2/s at a distance of
11 m) it could be used for the reactor monitoring and for fundamental research
including neutrino oscillation studies.
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Figure 1: Design of the DANSS neutrino detector (left) and its position under the
industrial reactor WWER-1000 (right).
The DANSS detector will consist of highly segmented plastic scintillator
with a total volume of 1 m3, surrounded with a composite shield of copper (Cu),
lead (Pb) and borated polyethylene (CHB), and vetoed against cosmic muons
with a number of external scintillator plates.
The basic element of DANSS is a polystyrene-based extruded scintillator
strip (1×4×100 cm3) with a thin Gd-containing surface coating which is a light
reflector and an (n, γ)-converter simultaneously (Fig. 2). The coating (about
0.1–0.2 mm) is produced by co-extrusion and consists of polystyrene with 18%
admixture of rutile and 6% of gadolinium oxide, so that the final Gd density is
about 1.6 mg/cm2, which corresponds to ∼0.35%wt. Light collection from the
strip is done via three wavelength-shifting Kuraray fibers Y-11, ⊘ 1.2 mm, glued
into grooves along all the strip. An opposite (blind) end of each fiber is polished
and covered with a mirror paint, which decreases a total lengthwise attenuation
of a light signal down to ∼5 %/m.
Each 50 parallel strips are combined into a module, so that the whole detec-
tor (2500 strips) is a structure of 50 intercrossing modules (Fig. 2). Each module
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is viewed by a compact photomultiplier tube (Hamamatsu R7600U) coupled to
all 50 strips of the module via 100 WLS fibers, two per strip. In addition, to get
more precise energy and space pattern of an event, each strip is equipped with
an individual multipixel photosensor (SiPM) operating in the Geiger mode and
coupled to the strip via the third WLS fiber.
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Figure 2: The basic element (left) and two of fifty intersecting modules (right) of the
DANSS detector.
In order to check operability of the DANSS design, compare different ac-
quisition schemes and measure the real background conditions, a simplified pilot
version of the detector (DANSSino) was created. Below we present the DANSSino
description and some results of numerous tests performed at the JINR laboratory,
as well as under the KNPP reactor.
2 The DANSSino design
DANSSino consists of exactly the same basic elements as the main DANSS de-
tector. One hundred strips of DANSSino (Fig. 2) form a bar 20 × 20 × 100 cm3
divided into two modules: the odd strip layers are coupled to the X-PMT and
the even ones to the Y-PMT. Together with an additional neutron counter2 both
modules are equipped with simple front-end preamplifiers and placed into a light-
tight box. Information from the individual photodiodes of each strip is not used
in this prototype. To perform energy calibration, a teflon tube is placed inside
the bundle of strips, so that a tiny radioactive source can be inserted in the de-
tector with a thin flexible string. For this purpose several gamma and neutron
sources with activity of few Bq were produced: 137Cs, 60Co, 22Na, 248Cm. To
suppress external background caused by gamma-rays and thermal neutrons the
detector is surrounded with a passive shield. As it is rather compact, the com-
position of the shielding can be easily changed. A set of big scintillator plates
2This 3He gas-based counter allows high sensitivity monitoring of the thermal neutron
flux inside the detector shielding.
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(200×50×3 cm3) similar to that employed in the GERDA experiment [4] form an
active veto system which is used to tag the events associated with cosmic muons.
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Figure 3: The DANSSino detector
The Inverse Beta-Decay (IBD) of hydrogen atoms in the detector body is
used to detect the reactor antineutrino
ν˜e + p→ e
+ + n . (1)
The detection process proceeds in two steps: the first one applies to the positron
and the second to the neutron. The energy threshold of the IBD reaction is
1.8 MeV, while most of the remaining neutrino energy is transferred to the
positron. The positron deposits its energy within a short range of few cm and
then annihilates emitting two 511 keV photons at 180◦. As a result, the first
(Prompt) energy deposit is distributed in space in a very specific way. The sec-
ond (Delayed) step is the detection of the neutron. Initial energy of the neutron
is only few keV. After moderation in the plastic scintillator it is captured by
157Gd or 155Gd with a very high cross-section. In both cases a cascade of γ-rays
is emitted with the total energy of about 8 MeV. Because of high multiplicity and
deep penetration in plastic these γ-rays produce a flash which is spread widely
within a sphere with a diameter of about 30-40 cm, so that a number of strips
in both X and Y modules are usually fired. Distribution of time between the
Prompt and Delayed signals is described by a combination of two exponents
f1(t) =
1
τc − τm
(
e−t/τc − e−t/τm
)
, (2)
where the characteristic times τm and τc correspond to the neutron moderation
and capture respectively and depend on the detector structure.
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Though the IBD event has a very specific signature, it occurs under intense
external and internal γ, n and µ background. Therefore, adequate selection rules
(hardware trigger) should be worked out in advance.
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Figure 4: Left: two alternative types of the hardware trigger (HT ) for the true IBD
event consisting of the Prompt (P ) and Delayed (D) signals in presence of background
pulses (B). Right: a simplified diagram of the QDC-based acquisition system used in
DANSSino.
There are two obvious types of this hardware trigger. The most reliable of
them is detection of the Delayed neutron capture, as the amplitude and multiplic-
ity of the neutron signal are much higher than those of the natural γ-background.
This method (Fig. 4a) requires digitization of the total data stream with flash
ADCs and subsequent on-line analysis of the preceding signals (in this way one
can spot the Prompt signal which could happen few tens of a microsecond before
the hardware trigger HT and have relatively low energy). This trigger is planned
to be used in the full-scale DANSS spectrometer, but at the DANSSino stage it
seems to be untimely and impractical.
The other trigger implemented in this work is simpler but less reliable
because it can successfully function only under a lower background count rate.
Within this method (Fig. 4b), the hardware trigger HT is produced by any
Prompt signal, and then the system waits for the Delayed signal during some
fixed time W . The energy of both Prompt and Delayed signals (EP and ED)
detected by both X and Y modules are measured with two Charge-to-Digital
Converters (QDCP and QDCD), which are gated separately by the SP and SD
strobes (Fig. 4c). Finally, each collected event contains 4 energies (EXP , EY P ,
EXD, EY D), time between the P and D pulses (TPD) and information about the
muon veto (which of the plates were fired and when).
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3 Ground laboratory tests
Numerous tests with the DANSSino detector were performed at the ground floor
of the JINR laboratory building (Dubna). Measurements with 137Cs, 22Na and
60Co γ-sources (Fig. 5) compared with the MC simulations were used to cali-
brate the energy scale, estimate the energy resolution and set the lower energy
thresholds of the discriminators.
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Figure 5: Energy spectra measured with γ-sources (left) and the noise peaks (right).
As the light collection from a long strip is far from being perfect, the number
of photoelectrons (p.e.) produced at the PMT photocathode is relatively small.
Therefore, the energy resolution of the spectrometer is determined mainly by
the Poisson dispersion of this number and depends on the energy deposit in the
scintillator which corresponds to a single photoelectron εpe. In order to estimate
it, single-photoelectron noise peaks were measured with both X and Y modules.
As a result, εpe was found to be about 100 keV/p.e.
The next important parameter of the spectrometer is its selective sensitivity
to neutrons. The 248Cm neutron source provides signals with a signature very
similar to the neutrino-like events. Indeed, the Delayed signal is caused by the
same 157,155Gd(n, γ) reaction, whereas the Prompt signal corresponds either to
the (n-p) scattering of the initial fast neutron on hydrogen in the plastic detector
or to the prompt γ-rays following the 248Cm fission. In the first case the most
probable is the response of only one of the two PMTs (XP⊕YP ) and in the second
case the response of both (XP ∧YP )
3. The Prompt energy spectra corresponding
3The symbols ∧ (AND) and ⊕ (XOR) here and below stand for logical operations of
conjunction and exclusive disjunction, respectively.
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to these cases are very different, whereas the Delayed spectra have the same shape
(Fig. 6).
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Figure 6: Energy (left) ant time (right) spectra of the neutrino-like events measured
with the 248Cm source. The spectra corresponding to the (XP ⊕YP ) and (XP ∧YP ) logic
of the Prompt signals are marked with ⊕ and ∧ superscripts, respectively. The Delayed
signal is required to be of the (XD ∧ YD) type only.
The TPD time distribution is also very similar to the IBD. The only differ-
ence is much higher neutron multiplicity (k ≃ 3), so that instead of expression
(2) it is described by a more complicated function
fk(t) = f1(t) ·

1−
t∫
0
f1(τ)dτ


k−1
=
e
−t
τc − e
−t
τm
(τc − τm)
k
·
(
τc e
−t
τc − τm e
−t
τm
)k−1
, (3)
which reflects the fact than only the first of k neutrons is detected by our ac-
quisition system. Quantitative analysis of the 248Cm data shown in Fig. 6 with
k = 3 gives the following values for the moderation and capture specific times:
τm ≃ 3± 1 µs τc ≃ 24± 1 µs (4)
Measurements performed without radioactive sources but with different
composition of passive shielding confirm that 10 cm of heavy material (copper
and/or lead) is quite enough to suppress the natural gamma background, and
10 cm of borated polyethylene reject thermal neutrons. On the other hand, it
was found that in addition to gamma rays, muons and thermal neutrons, the lab-
oratory natural background contains a significant number of neutrino-like events
(≃ 300 per hour) consisting of both Prompt and Delayed signals – (P+D)-pairs.
The ED energy spectrum and TPD time distribution of those events are of the
similar shape as in the 248Cm case. It is natural to assume that the events are
caused by fast neutrons which could not be rejected even with 16 cm of borated
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polyethylene. Indeed, it is known [5, 6] that the high-energy hadronic component
of the cosmic background at sea level could be as high as 102/m2/s depending on
the energy and the site4, and a low-Z shielding equivalent to at least 20 meters
of water (20 m w. e.) is needed to suppress it.
4 Tests under the KNPP industrial reactor
After the ground laboratory tests the DANSSino detector was transported to the
Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant (Udomlya, 285 km NW of Dubna) and installed in
a service room of Unit#3, at a distance of 11 m from the reactor core center.
Unit#3 is a twin of Unit#4 where the main DANSS detector is being mounted
now (Fig. 1). The unit includes a typical Russian industrial water-moderated
water-cooled power reactor WWER-1000 [8] of thermal power 3 GWth. Huge
reservoirs with technological liquids, thick walls of heavy concrete, the reactor
body and equipment placed above the room provide excellent shielding (≃50 m
w. e.) which completely removes fast cosmic neutrons. The muon component
is suppressed by a factor of ≃6. The gamma background at the detector site is
slightly higher than at the JINR laboratory because of high 40K contamination
of the surrounding concrete. Thermal and epithermal reactor neutrons penetrate
the room through the monitoring tubes and increase the average background as
well. Fortunately, the flux of those neutrons measured with the external four-
fold 3He gas-based neutron detector turned out to be not too high and could be
suppressed with ∼10–15 cm of borated polyethylene (CHB); in addition, slow
neutrons cannot emulate the IBD process because of their small energy.
The results of some background measurements performed at the JINR lab-
oratory and under the operating KNPP reactor with and without shielding are
presented in Table 1. Some of the JINR and KNPP measurement conditions,
such as the PMT high voltage, discriminator thresholds, energy scale, etc., could
be slightly different, so that the values presented in the table should be considered
as illustrative only. The X and Y columns of the table indicate the number of
raw pulses with an energy ≥ 0.25 MeV. From these values it is seen that although
the initial background conditions under the reactor are worse, a relatively thin
passive shielding (10 cm of lead and 16 cm of borated polyethylene) improves it
significantly and makes even 3 times better than in the laboratory. The next two
columns reflect mainly the flux of thermal neutrons and cosmic muons, respec-
tively (the neutrons produce X∧Y-coincidences with the total energy between
the threshold and 8 MeV, whereas the muons also cause X∧Y coincidences but
4More precise calculation [7] for neutrons with En ≥ 10 MeV under the JINR condi-
tions yield the value of (40-50)/m2/s.
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saturate the QDCs).
Table 1: Background in the JINR laboratory and under the KNPP reactor measured
by DANSSino unshielded and shielded with 10 cm of lead, 16 cm of CHB and µ-veto
plates (here and below the shielding composition is enumerated from inside to outside).
Operation Detector Module count rate, (P+D) pairs
conditions shielding counts per second per day
X Y X∧Y X∧Y
E≥0.25 E≥0.25 E≥0.5 E≥8.0 NO µ AND µ
γ+n+µ γ+n+µ n+µ ∼ µ
JINR no shielding 532 465 235 19 601 400
natural BG Pb+CHB+µ-veto 61 58 42 17 30 750 9 030
KNPP no shielding 1 470 1 360 408 4 11 837 500
5×1013ν/cm2/s Pb+CHB+µ-veto 20 19 11 2 1 240 980
Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 show the rate of events consisting of
(Prompt+Delayed) signal pairs without any additional selection. A big number of
these events for the unshielded detector arises from random coincidences caused
by the high raw count rate. In the case of the shielded detector those are signals
mainly from the fast neutrons. As expected, the number of these false neutrino-
like events under the reactor becomes orders of magnitude lower than at the
laboratory, but still differs from zero. The remaining part is mostly associated
with the µ-veto signals and corresponds probably to secondary fast neutrons
produced by cosmic muons in the surrounding heavy materials (lead and copper).
Table 2: Number of false neutrino-like events associated with µ-veto signals and regis-
tered by DANSSino shielded with different materials.
Run# KNPP#027 KNPP#035 KNPP#044
Shielding Pb =10 cm
CHB =16 cm
CHB =8 cm
Pb =10 cm
Cu =5 cm
CHB =8 cm
Pb =5 cm
Events per day 835±7 214±4 384±4
This assumption was confirmed by measurements performed with different
composition of the passive shielding (Table 2). These data were analyzed under
relatively strong requirements which correspond to the IBD signature:
• the time between the Prompt and Delayed signals must be within a rea-
sonable range TPD ∈ [1.5 − 30.0] µs;
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• the Delayed signal should correspond to the Gd(n,γ) reaction, i.e., both
the X and Y modules should be fired (XD ∧ YD) with a reasonable
5 total
energy EXD + EY D = ED ∈ [1− 8] MeV;
• the Prompt energy must also be in a right range EP ∈ [1− 7] MeV.
It is evident from Table 2 that 5 cm of copper in the close vicinity to the
detector body increase the number of false neutrino-like events by a factor of 2,
and 10 cm of lead increase it by a factor of 4. Of course, these false events could be
tagged and then rejected by the veto system, but the efficiency of any veto never
reaches 100%. On the other hand, heavy materials cannot be avoided completely
as they are needed for shielding against external gamma-rays; therefore they
should be isolated from the detector with an intermediate moderator.
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Figure 7: Time dependence of the reactor power (bottom of each diagram) and the
number of the neutrino-like events detected by DANSSino (top of each diagram) for two
measurement periods.
Two of our measurement runs came across few-days interruptions in the
reactor operation (OFF periods), so that it was possible to estimate background
experimentally without the neutrino flux6. Figure 7 shows time diagrams of these
runs. The lower parts of the diagrams show the actual reactor power measured
5As the detector is small, significant part of the γ-cascade is not detected, and there-
fore the acceptable ED range is extended to the lower energy.
6Really, when the reactor is stopped, neutrinos are still emitted by the radioactive
fission products, but the decay energy of long-lived nuclei is low and therefore those
OFF-neutrinos cannot be detected because of the IBD energy threshold.
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with the external high-sensitive neutron counter installed near the outlet of the
monitoring neutron tube. Strong correlation between the reactor power and the
number of the neutrino-like events detected by DANSSino is obvious.
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Figure 8: Time evolution of the reactor power during Run KNPP#044 and the raw
count rate of the neutron sensor inside the shielding and both the X and Y modules. No
visible correlation is observed.
There could be doubts about a nature of the count rate variations – are
they really caused by the neutrino-induced IBD or by the random coincidences
of gamma-rays with external neutron background, which is known to be strongly
correlated with the reactor operation? Trying to answer this question, we ana-
lyzed time evolution of the background inside the DANSSino shielding (Fig. 8).
At first glance, it seems that there is no visible correlation between the reactor
power and the raw count rate of both X and Y modules (which detect mainly
gamma rays). Unfortunately, sensitivity of the 3He gas-based neutron sensor is
not high enough to detect a very low but still non-zero neutron flux inside the
shielding. Therefore, its count rate shown in Fig. 8 is caused mainly by cosmic
rays and internal radioactive pollution, as well as by electric noise, so that ab-
sence of any visible correlation cannot be considered as an argument in favour of
the neutrino versus the neutron correlated background.
Numerical values of the neutrino-like count rates, Signal-to-Background
ratios and muon-induced background rates are given in Table 3, which describes
the neutrino-like events detected with different low energy thresholds (EminP =0.5,
1.0 and 1.5 MeV) and alternative logic of the Prompt signals (XP ⊕ YP ) and
(XP ∧ YP ).
Analysis of Table 3 allows the following conclusions.
• Intensities of the muon-induced background events do not differ for the ON
and OFF periods, which confirms the adequate operation of the acquisition
system.
• A heavy shielding (5 cm of copper) without an inner moderator increases
the background by 70%, as was already shown in Table 2, but improves
11
Table 3: Rate of the neutrino-like events with (XP ⊕ YP ) and (XP ∧ YP ) logic of the
Prompt signal registered by DANSSino at the ON and OFF reactor periods.
RUN# P -signal Number of neutrino-like events per day S/B
shielding Emin
P
XP -YP tagged by µ-veto free of µ-veto S = ratio
structure MeV logic ON OFF ON OFF ON–OFF (≈)
KNPP#035 0.5 Xp⊕Yp 169±3 173±9 361±4 249±11 112±12 0.45
Xp∧Yp 129±3 133±8 69±2 38± 4 30± 5 0.79
CHB 8 cm 1.0 Xp⊕Yp 92±2 95±7 125±3 66± 6 59± 6 0.89
Pb 10 cm Xp∧Yp 123±3 126±8 60±2 31± 4 29± 4 0.92
1.5 Xp⊕Yp 59±2 63±6 62±2 29± 4 34± 4 1.16
Xp∧Yp 108±2 105±7 48±2 20± 3 28± 4 1.43
KNPP#043 0.5 Xp⊕Yp 301±4 300±7 487±5 401± 9 86±10 0.44
+ #044 Xp∧Yp 243±3 246±7 112±2 76± 4 36± 4 0.46
Cu 5 cm 1.0 Xp⊕Yp 156±3 158±5 188±3 130± 5 58± 6 0.44
CHB 8 cm Xp∧Yp 228±3 231±6 99±2 64± 3 35± 4 0.54
Pb 5 cm 1.5 Xp⊕Yp 94±2 99±4 93±2 52± 3 42± 4 0.80
Xp∧Yp 195±3 201±6 77±2 44± 3 33± 3 0.74
the efficiency7 by ∼10%, returning part of the escaped true IBD neutrons
to the scintillator.
• The (XP ∧ YP ) logic of the Prompt signal corresponds to the stronger
selection condition and provides better S/B ratios but poorer statistics.
Indeed, the range of the recoil proton after the neutron scattering in poly-
styrene does not exceed 1–2 mm and therefore the Prompt signal of the
false background event caused by a fast neutron is detected most probably
by only one of the two modules (XP⊕YP ).
• Lowering the Prompt low-energy threshold EminP below ∼1 MeV in case
of (XP ∧YP ) logic gives no visible gain in statistics and only increases the
background thus impairing the S/B ratio.
• Under less strong (XP ⊕YP ) condition this lowering also gives rise to the
probability of random coincidences of γ-rays with external thermal neu-
trons. It so happened that the detector in the considered test runs was
not shielded against neutrons well enough, and therefore the rate of such
random coincidences was higher in the ON period, thus generating a false
positive (ON–OFF) difference. As the external γ-rays produce mostly low-
7The efficiency here means the probability to detect the IBD if it occurs.
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amplitude single pulses, the above effect shows itself mainly at the low EP
under the (XP⊕YP ) condition.
The latter statement is confirmed by the flat TPD time distribution of
the events with a low Prompt energy (EP ∈ [0.5 − 1.5] MeV) and (XP ⊕YP )
logic represented by curve 2 in Fig. 9. True IBD time curve 3 of the same figure
corresponds to the lowest row of Table 3 and agrees with the expectation well. Its
rate is significantly less sharp than that of curve 1 which was measured with the
248Cm source. Curves 4 and 5 correspond to the events associated with muons.
The steepness of their rate is somewhat between that of curves 1 and 3, which
reflects the intermediate neutron multiplicity (k ≃ 1.6) for the muon-induced
reactions in copper and lead shielding.
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Figure 9: The TPD time distribution measured with the 248Cm source compared to the
neutrino-like events detected under the operating reactor.
Energy spectra of the neutrino-like events detected at the reactor ON and
OFF periods and corresponding to the alternative (XP∧YP ) and (XP⊕YP ) logic
are shown in Fig. 10. The ON spectra demonstrate a non-zero positive excess
over the OFF ones in both cases, but their shapes are very different for the reason
mentioned above (the low-energy part of the (XP ⊕YP ) spectra is polluted with
random γ-n coincidences).
Nevertheless, assuming that the OFF data correspond to a pure back-
ground, one can build an energy spectrum of IBD positrons as a difference
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Figure 10: The EP energy spectra of the neutrino-like events detected at the reactor
ON and OFF periods.
S=N(ON)–N(OFF). As an example, EP spectra built under the (XP ∧YP ) and
(XP⊕YP ) requirements are shown in Fig. 11.
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Figure 11: The differential EP energy spectra of the neutrino-like events detected by
DANSSino. The dashed curve represents a typical example of the IBD positron energy
spectrum simulated for the 235U fission [9, 10, 11] and normalized to the number of
observed events.
In spite of poor statistics and merely illustrative character of the spectra,
the first of them and the higher-energy part of the second are in very good
agreement with the GEANT4 MC simulations taking into account the measured
detector parameters (photo-electron yield, attenuation of the light signal along
the strip, etc.). For example, MC simulations predict 75 events per day for
run #044 while 70±5 events were detected. This agreement gives additional
confirmation that we indeed observe IBD events.
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5 Summary
As a result of numerous tests performed with the DANSSino detector, the fol-
lowing conclusions can be drawn:
• The most important background under the WWER-1000 reactor originates
from fast neutrons produced by cosmic muons in high-Z surroundings.
Therefore, one should not place heavy materials inside the neutron moder-
ator.
• Efficiency of the muon-veto system should not be less than 95-97%. To
reach this level, it is planned to install a double layer of scintillator plates
with a lower threshold and use them in the coincidence mode.
• In spite of the small size, big edge effects, incomplete passive and active
shielding, and extremely simplified acquisition system, DANSSino is able
to detect reactor antineutrinos with the signal-to-background ratio around
unity and the efficiency at a level of 10%, which is in good agreement with
the MC simulations. As the full-scale DANSS detector is of much higher
volume, its response function is expected to be considerably better and effi-
ciency significantly higher (≃70%) because of a lower relative contribution
from the edge detector parts (fewer neutrons and γ-rays after n-capture
in Gd would leave the sensitive volume without detection, and the hard
thresholds could therefore be increased above 2–3 MeV without loss of ef-
ficiency). Together with the additional information from the individual
photo sensors providing the space pattern of each event, it will allow to
suppress the background down to a negligible value.
• Operation of such detectors at a shallow depth with overburden less than
10-20 m w.e. seems to be questionable, as the neutron component of cosmic
rays cannot be tagged by any veto system and produces a signature very
similar to the IBD but outnumbers it by orders of magnitude.
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